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In the Matter of Discipline of Paul Droz, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. 20 (June 28, 2007)1
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY – DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY 
Summary 
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that jurisdiction over Droz was appropriate under 
Supreme Court Rule 99,2 and affirmed disciplinary action recommended against Utah attorney 
Paul Droz. 
Disposition/Outcome 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board’s 
recommendation that Utah attorney Paul Droz be enjoined from practicing law in Nevada or 
appearing in any Nevada court, that he be fined $3,000 and assessed the disciplinary 
proceeding’s costs, and that the state bar be directed to refer this matter to appropriate law 
enforcement authorities for possible criminal investigation and to report the matter to the Utah 
and Arizona bars and the National Discipline Data Bank. 
Factual & Procedural History 
Droz was admitted to the Utah bar in 1978 and disbarred in Utah on June 1, 2006.  Droz 
neither responded to the Utah disciplinary authorities’ inquiries nor appeared at the Utah 
disciplinary hearing.  After his Utah clients complained to the Utah disciplinary authorities, but 
before the Utah formal disciplinary complaint was filed, Droz rented office space in Mesquite, 
Nevada, and proceeded to continue his misconduct with respect to at least six matters.   
A formal disciplinary complaint was filed by Nevada bar counsel on April 18, 2006, 
shortly before the Utah disbarment order was entered.  Droz was charged with one violation of 
SCR 153 (diligence), two violations of SCR 154 (communication), four violations of SCR 165 
(safekeeping property), one violation of SCR 172 (candor toward the tribunal), six violations of 
SCR 181 (truthfulness in statements to others), two violations of SCR 184 (respect for rights of 
third persons), six violations of SCR 189 (unauthorized practice of law), six violations of SCR 
195 (communications concerning a lawyer’s services), five violations of SCR 200(2) (failure to 
respond to disciplinary authority), two violations of SCR 203(2) (criminal act that reflects 
adversely on lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), six violations of SCR 
203(3) (conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation), and two violations of 
SCR 203(4) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).3
                                                 
1 By Michelle L’Hommedieu 
2 The former version of the Supreme Court Rules concerning professional misconduct is cited as 
Droz’s actions occurred prior to the 2006 renumbering and amendment of the Rules.  See Nevada 
Pay TV v. District Court, 102 Nev. 203, 205 n.2, 719 P.2d 797, 798 n.2 (1986), superseded by 
rule as acknowledged in State, Dep’t Mtr. Veh. v. Dist. Ct., 113 Nev. 1338, 948 P.2d 261 (1997). 
3 Id. 
  
The state bar’s early correspondence concerning the grievances was served upon Droz at 
his Mesquite office address, which was also the address on file with the Utah bar, and, on one 
occasion, at his residence address as listed on his joint petition for divorce, filed in the Eighth 
Judicial District Court.  But the state bar was unable to effect personal service of the formal 
discipline complaint upon Droz at either of these addresses, and so the state bar hired an 
investigator in an attempt to locate Droz.  The investigator was unable to confirm Droz’s 
whereabouts, although some information indicated that Droz may have gone to Scottsdale, 
Arizona.  The state bar eventually served the complaint by sending it via certified mail, return 
receipt requested, to the Mesquite office address, in accordance with SCR 109(1).4  Droz failed 
to file an answer, and bar counsel filed a notice of intent to proceed on a default basis; this notice 
was also sent via certified mail to Droz’s Mesquite office address.  Droz failed to respond.  
Notice of the formal hearing was served the same way.  Droz failed to appear for the hearing.   
The hearing panel considered the complaint’s allegations to have been deemed admitted 
under SCR 105(2),5 and it proceeded to consider what discipline could be imposed since Droz 
was not licensed in Nevada.  The panel eventually decided on a recommendation to this court 
that Droz be barred from ever being admitted to the Nevada bar, that he be enjoined from 
practicing law in Nevada or appearing in any Nevada court, that he be fined $500 per count, for a 
total of $3,000, and that he be assessed the costs of the discipline proceeding, in the amount of 
$987.45.  It also recommended that the state bar be directed to refer the matter to the appropriate 
law enforcement agencies for possible criminal proceedings and to report the matter directly to 
the Arizona and Utah bars.  The court automatically reviewed the panel’s recommendation.  
Droz did not file a brief or other response to contest the panel’s recommendation. 
Discussion 
The court first analyzed whether the Nevada court had jurisdiction over Droz, then 
whether the panel’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and last whether 
the recommended discipline is appropriate. 
Jurisdiction 
SCR 99(1) provides, in pertinent part, “Every attorney . . . practicing law here, whether 
specially admitted or not, is subject to the exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of the supreme court 
and the disciplinary boards and hearing panels created by these rules.”  Other jurisdictions with 
similar rules have uniformly held that a lawyer not admitted in the jurisdiction, but who 
nevertheless practiced law in that jurisdiction, is properly subject to discipline where he or she 
practiced.6   
                                                 
4 The rules governing procedure in lawyer discipline cases were amended effective March 1, 
2007.  Since the formal complaint in this matter was filed before that date, the former version 
applies.  See SCR 122 (2006). 
5 See supra note 2. 
6 See In re Bagdade, 334 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 
2001); Matter of Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 1995); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Shane, 553 S.W.2d 
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NRS 7.285 prescribes criminal penalties for the unauthorized practice of law.  But as a 
practical matter, such a complaint to law enforcement, which is also responsible for investigating 
matters such as violent crimes and drug offenses, would almost certainly be accorded a lower 
priority.  Given this lower priority, by the time law enforcement could devote resources to an 
unauthorized practice of law complaint, several more clients could be harmed.  Also, while NRS 
7.285(3) permits the state bar to file a civil action and seek an injunction against a person 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, this court, as the ultimate authority over attorneys 
as officers of the court, has a special interest in enforcing its rules governing the legal 
profession.7  And although an injunction as provided in NRS 7.285(3) may prevent future harm, 
it cannot punish past misconduct. 
Moreover, Droz’s actions clearly illustrate why this court should exercise jurisdiction 
over his conduct: Droz is already disbarred in Utah and so very little more disciplinary action 
could be imposed upon him there, and his misconduct affected several Nevada citizens, a Nevada 
lawyer, and the Nevada court system.  Droz has apparently fled the jurisdiction, and so an 
injunction at this point would be ineffective.  Criminal penalties against Droz are likewise of 
questionable effect, at least unless and until he is located and subject to arrest. 
Accordingly, while the sanctions to be imposed must be tailored to Droz’s lack of a 
Nevada law license, the Nevada court has jurisdiction to impose professional discipline upon him 
and should exercise that jurisdiction. 
Panel’s recommendation 
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized in In re Stuhff, “[t]hough persuasive, the [panel’s] 
findings and recommendations are not binding on this court.  This court must review the record 
de novo and exercise its independent judgment to determine whether and what type of discipline 
is warranted.”8  The panel’s misconduct findings must be supported by clear and convincing 
                                                                                                                                                             
467 (Ky. 1977); see also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317, 335-36 (W. Va. 
1996) (applying the jurisdictional rule existing at the time of the alleged conduct, respondents 
did not “regularly” practice law in West Virginia and thus could not properly be sanctioned, but 
noting that under the new rule, requiring only the “practice of law,” respondents would be 
subject to sanctions).  A similar conclusion was reached in Waters v. Barr, 103 Nev. 694, 747 
P.2d 900 (1987). 
7 SCR 39 (“Attorneys being court officers and essential aids in the administration of justice, the 
government of the legal profession is a judicial function.  Authority to admit to practice and to 
discipline is inherent and exclusive in the courts.  [The Supreme Court Rules] are the exclusive 
rules for the governing of the legal profession in Nevada.”); NRS 7.275(1) (“The State Bar of 
Nevada, a public corporation heretofore created by statute, is hereby continued under the 
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Supreme Court.”). 
8 108 Nev. 629, 633, 837 P.2d 853, 855 (1992).   
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evidence.9  The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the panel’s 
findings.10
The court’s analysis of the panel’s recommendation discipline referenced similar 
situations in other jurisdictions.  The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that, while a law license 
issued by California was not subject to sanction by the Indiana court, the Indiana court “may 
impose penalties appropriate to punish or prevent misconduct that occurs in Indiana.”11  
Examples of penalties considered or imposed by other courts in situations similar to this case 
include public reprimands, a temporary or permanent prohibition on future admission, including 
pro hac vice admission, injunctive relief, contempt sanctions, fines, and payment of costs.12
Here, the hearing panel recognized the limitations on the discipline it could impose, since 
Droz did not have a Nevada law license.  Thus, it tailored its recommendations to the specific 
facts.  First, the panel recommended that the court enjoin Droz from practicing law in Nevada or 
appearing in any Nevada court.  The court deemed the panel’s recommendation appropriate. 
Second, the panel recommended a fine of $500 per count, for a total of $3,000.  In light 
of the harm caused by Droz to Nevada’s justice system and to several Nevada citizens, a $3,000 
fine is warranted. 
Third, in view of the apparently criminal nature of Droz’s fraudulent arbitration scheme, 
the panel recommended that the matter be referred to the appropriate law enforcement 
authorities.  The court agreed that a referral to law enforcement was appropriate.  However, the 
court modified the panel’s recommendation to include federal authorities.  Accordingly, this 
recommendation, with one slight modification, was deemed proper. 
Finally, the panel recommended that bar counsel be directed to provide a copy of the 
court’s opinion directly to the Utah and Arizona bars.  This was also deemed appropriate because 
if Droz has in fact relocated to Scottsdale, he may very well be perpetrating similar misconduct 
there, and so expedited notice to Arizona is proper.  Also, since Droz was licensed in Utah, that 
state also has a particular interest in this matter.   
Conclusion 
The court concluded that the panel’s recommended discipline is appropriate “to punish or 
prevent misconduct that occurs” in Nevada, and that it should be approved, with the one slight 
modification of including notice to federal law enforcement authorities.   
                                                 
9 In re Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995). 
10 See SCR 105(2)(e). 
11 Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 722; see also Bagdade, 334 F.3d at 571-72. 
12 See Bagdade, 334 F.3d at 571-72; Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 722-23; Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d at 
61; Shane, 553 S.W.2d at 468. 
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Accordingly, Paul Droz is prohibited from practicing law in Nevada and from appearing 
in any Nevada court.  Additionally, Droz shall pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding and a 
fine of $3,000.  Further, the state bar was directed to refer this matter to any appropriate federal, 
state, or county law enforcement authorities for possible criminal investigation.  The state bar 
was also directed to serve a copy of this opinion upon the Utah and Arizona bars.  Finally, the 
state bar shall serve a copy of this opinion upon Droz at his last-known address. 
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